A proxy terminates one connection and opens another on behalf of a represented party. A forward proxy represents egress clients; a reverse proxy represents origins for inbound traffic.
For concrete implementation patterns and configuration tradeoffs, see Nginx.

Trust and Scope
Choose proxy type by ownership and failure boundary:
- Forward proxy: policy-controlled client path to external services.
- Reverse proxy: public entry point for service traffic, plus routing, TLS edge, and buffering.
Neither is automatically secure. Identity and trust are defined by configuration controls: authentication, rewritten headers, certificate handling, and bypass policy.
If you use an enterprise forward proxy with interception, TLS is terminated at the proxy and headers are policy-bound. If you use a non-intercepting tunnel, encryption remains end-to-end to the upstream endpoint.
Example
- Forward proxy:
Browser -> enterprise forward proxy CONNECT api.example.com:443 -> targetnormally makes the target observe the proxy’s network address. The proxy still sees the client, and authentication or forwarding metadata can expose client identity, so it remains a trusted observer that needs strict allowlists and tunnel policy. - Reverse proxy:
Internet client -> reverse proxy (TLS terminate) -> app servicecentralizes ingress rules. If the reverse proxy drops or rewritesX-Forwarded-Forincorrectly, downstream systems can record the proxy IP instead of the real client.
Shared Failure Pattern
Proxy centralization concentrates outage risk. Redundant instances reduce single-path blast radius, and 502/504 class failures usually indicate upstream/proxy boundary issues before application logic.
References
- Proxy vs Reverse Proxy (ByteByteGo snapshot) — source distinction and request flow.
- HTTP Semantics: CONNECT (RFC 9110 §9.3.6) — tunnel request behavior.
- HTTP Caching (RFC 9111) — shared cache behavior and freshness rules.
- Forwarded HTTP Extension (RFC 7239) — proxy metadata and security expectations.
- TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) — the handshake and authentication boundary that tunneling preserves and interception terminates.